Turkey & Macedonia

Johan, you are not forgotten!

Macedonian people are with you!

Since the formation of the association “United for Johan” all members have been actively involved in planning, organizing activities and promoting the campaign in order to give unreserved support to our hero Johan. One of our biggest achievements is the new updated web site, where everyone can find out more details about the case, about our association, contacts, articles, Johan’s biography, photos and links. In order to effectively promote our campaign and support Johan we are organizing the “Duke Night” on the 24 of October 2009 in Melbourne. The Macedonian people will have the opportunity to celebrate the national VMRO day, and band together to send a clear message to Hague that they support Johan, sympathies with his plight and will campaign for his release.
We also designed & distributed hundreds of yellow t-shirts with the logo “United for Johan”. The t-shirts were worn by the youths of Macedonia during the national holiday “ Ilinden” in Krusevo, Republic of Macedonia and a generous number will be worn by Macedonian football supporters Komiti in Skopje during the sports events.
Our main goal is to stress to the Macedonian people’s contempt of The Hague Tribunal’s decision and injustice which undermined Macedonia and the whole international legal system. Johan’s new trial is on 29 of October and therefore we urge all individuals, organizations and associations to give their support by sending personal messages to Johan. We also invite all individuals and organizations to become members of our Association hence contribute to the success of the campaign and hopefully to his freedom.
It is time to show our unreserved support, it is time to show that we are in solidarity with Johan and willing to unite against this injustice.
During these difficult times Johan must know that the Macedonian people sympathize with his plight, supports him and is fighting for his release.

http://www.unitedforjohan.com/

ohan Tarculovski was born on 17 November 1974 in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. His father Mladen and mother Gordana named him after the famous Dutch footballer Johan Croif. He has a sister named Sonja that currently resides in Macedonia.

Johan is now married to Sonja Tarulovska and has two kids.

Johan Taculovski grew up in Skopje, in the Chair district where he completed his primary and secondary education. After completing the compulsory army service in 1993 he worked as a private security guard for various companies throughout Skopje and Macedonia. In 1999 Johan Tarculovski was promoted as Escort Inspector in the presidential security guard after a direct request from the President of the Republic of Macedonia Mr Boris Trajkovski.

After numerous attacks against the Macedonian security forces between Friday 10 August 2001 and Sunday 12 August 2001, the Macedonian army and police launched an offensive against the Albanian terrorist in the village of Ljuboten. It is alleged that Johan Tarculovski directly took part in the attacks by giving out orders in person.

Johan Tarculovski was charged on the 22 December 2004 together with Ljube Boskoski on three counts of violations of the laws and customs of war. The proceedings against Johan Tarculovski were based on both his individual criminal responsibility (Art. 7 §1 ICTY Statute) and his superior hierarchical responsibility (Art. 7 § 3 ICTY Statute) on three counts of violations of the laws and customs of war:

* murder;
* wanton destruction of towns and villages;
* cruel treatment.

Even though Mr Tarculovski was charged on the 22 December 2004 and his whereabouts were known at all time, he was never invited to appear in court or was he questioned about any of the charges. He was transferred from Skopje to The Hague on 21 March 2005 by a special airplane that left the Skopje airport at around 7am without been granted an opportunity to say good bye to his family.

At his initial court appearance on 1 April 2005, he pleaded not guilty.

The trial of Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarculovski started on 16 April 2007. The Prosecution completed its case on 6 December 2007.

The Defence cases commenced on 30 January 2008 and were completed on 18 March 2008.

The closing arguments took place between 6 and 8 May 2008.

The following information relates to Johan’s military career and his case at the Hague.
Definitions of Terrorism

Terrorism is used as an attempt to influence political behaviour (For example, to force opponents to agree to some or all the demands of the terrorists, to cause exaggerated reaction by the authorities, to cause greater conflict or to publicize the political objectives of the terrorists).

According to Article 313 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, terrorism is defined as a criminal act which:

“with the aim of threatening the constitutional order and security of the Republic of Macedonia will cause or seriously threaten through initiating explosions, fires, floods or other dangerous actions or acts of violence, /thus/ creating a feeling of insecurity or fear in the population.”

Emergence of Albanian terrorist groups and terrorist attacks prior to 2001

The emergence of Albanian terrorist groups in Macedonia is closely linked to the situation in Kosovo and southern Serbia. Although the roots of the illegal operation of smaller groups of armed Albanian extremists in Macedonia can be traced back to the period of 1982 with the creation of the “National Movement for Kosovo” (”LPK”), and 1993 with the secret meeting in Kičevo, western Macedonia, between Albanian extremist idea-makers in Macedonia – Ahmeti, Veliu, Džemaili /Xhemaili and Hašim Tači, the real roots and foundations for the operation of armed Albanian extremists in Macedonia are linked to the signing of the Agreement for the Transformation of the so called “Kosovo Liberation Army” (”KLA”) in 1999.

In order to achieve their goals, the Albanian terrorists formed funds in western countries (including Switzerland, Germany, US and others) where they gathered money from activities such as the drug trade, human trafficking and pressure on Albanians from the Diaspora.

The first Albanian terrorist attacks in Macedonia (led by Ali Ahmeti and Fazli Veliu) started in the late 1997 as follows:

1. On 16 December 1997, the Municipal Court in Gostivar, Western Macedonia was attacked with an explosive devise;
2. On 4 January 1998, police stations in Kumanovo, northern Macedonia and Prilep, central Macedonia, were attacked with explosive devises;
3. On 13 April 1998, the Municipal Court in Kičevo was attacked with an explosive devise.

The terrorist attacks continued throughout 1999 and 2000 and culminated in 2001. Following the dissolution of the KLA, one part of its membership joined the ranks of Kosovo’s political parties; the second part was integrated into the newly formed Kosovo Protection Corps, while the third part, which was left without work and in search of new prospects, turned towards Macedonia. This third part was led by those that had lost the local elections in Kosovo, were not thrilled by the changes that took place in Belgrade and loathed the democracy and stability in Macedonia. Veliu, Ahmeti and Xhemaili did not want to and could not accept defeat. They devised new plans. At a series of meetings held in 1999 they deliberated over how to replicate the Kosovo recipe in Macedonia. They were joined in their activities by extremist oriented individuals from southern Serbia and Macedonia, as well as by individuals and groups from other well-known Albanian emigrant political and militant groups and organizations in Western Europe.
Terrorist attacks in 2001

The first terrorist attack by the so called NLA in 2001 was at the police station Tearce, near Tetovo, western Macedonia, where police officer Momir Stojanovski was killed and three other police officers were severely injured.
The strategy of the NLA

The strategy of the NLA consisted of attacking soft or easier targets (such as police stations or convoys) with a view to trigger a disproportionate reaction on the part of the authorities that would in turn be used by the NLA for propaganda purposes to increase the support of the NLA. As the Janes Defence explained:

“At present, KLA terrorism in Macedonia is still a relatively minor issue, just as it was in Kosovo from 1995 to 1998. The KLA started its activities by attacking Serbian police patrols. However, the ultimate aim is to provoke the authorities into making a military response which will serve to unite the ethnic Albanian minority in western Macedonia.”

Mr. James Pardew, special envoy of the United States, said that:

“[NLA] strategy is the same strategy that we encountered in Serbia; that is, to provoke a repressive military and to gain support from that response from the population.”

The operational tactics and methodology of the practice of armed violence by the armed Albanian extremists must nonetheless be identified as terrorism.

These tactics included:

1. Creating fear among the non-ethnic Albanian population and those ethnic Albanians that were loyal to the State;
2. Expelling the non-ethnic Albanian population;
3. Holding the organs of the State and security forces in a constant state of tension and uncertainty over the initiation of an armed revolt;
4. Internationalizing their aims and presenting them as a fight for the rights of the Albanians in order to garner support from international factors; and
5. Imposing a policy of fait accompli on the Macedonian government.

The methods used included:

1. Surprise;
2. Choosing buildings to attack;
3. Choosing the status of the individuals that would be attacked;
4. Preventing unhindered communication through blockades and mining of roads;
5. Destroying and looting the property of non-ethnic Albanians;
6. Expelling the non-ethnic Albanian population from their homes;
7. Kidnapping;
8. The maltreatment and intimidation of innocent civilians;
9. Forced labour;
10. Forced conscription;
11. Use of children as fighters;
12. Initiating hostilities in areas known to be inhabited by civilians;
13. Murder of unarmed civilians;
14. Preventing the flow of water and incapacitating the water network that supplied Kumanovo, northern Macedonia, and for a shorter period, Tetovo;
15. Forcing part of the ethnic Albanian population to support them with logistics and, to a lesser extent, with direct participation in the practice of armed violence.

Tactic not to use uniforms

One of the tactics used by the NLA to avoid capture, easily move between villages and towns and withdraw from their positions of attack within the civilian population, was to conduct its attacks out of uniform (ie. plain clothed). As noted by OSCE:

“The village of Tanuševci has been the scene of a withdrawal northwards of up to 100 of the Ethnic Albanian Armed Groups which had been occupying the area since about the 21st February. The ethnic Albanian armed group members were observed to have moved into the village of Debelde where there appeared to be dressed in normal civilian clothing having abandoned both military style uniforms and weapons.”

Tactics to hide in civilian buildings and use human shields

The NLA used human shields as a tactic against the Macedonian forces. As noted by NATO:

“Other NATO officials and Macedonian defence sources fear that the thousands of civilians trapped against their will in villages under constant bombardment north of Tetovo, just ten miles from Kosovo border, are being held by NLA rebels partly as ‘human shields’ and partly because the Macedonian forces would be almost certain to kill civilians if they launch a ground assaulted. “

“The Skopje operational zone includes Skopje immediate surroundings. NLA groups hide out in predominantly Albanian villages surrounding Skopje.”

After an attack, the NLA would withdraw in ethnic Albanian villages and pretend to be normal citizens. The NLA was using the ethnic Albanian villages as logistics for such attacks. The Macedonian government refrained from using force and repeatedly called upon civilians to evacuate but the NLA prohibited them from doing so.

The NLA used historical sites and other buildings (including mosques) as military installations in order to provoke security forces to attack and use it as propaganda purposes.

The NLA did not refrain from using children as human shields as it was stationing and firing next to places where children were playing. The NLA did not always publicly declare its presence. The NLA was also present in villages where it lacked defence positions.
Tactic to disguise NLA members as civilians

The armed and plain clothed NLA regularly mingled with civilians, especially when they retreated within the civilian population after losing battles against the Macedonian security forces. This made it very difficult for the Macedonian security forces to differentiate the NLA from civilians and take action against the NLA. This is also why paraffin tests were undertaken to try to identify NLA members. As OSCE reported:

“Indeed, during the collapse of the cease-fire in Tetovo in August, armed ethnic Albanians in civilian clothes were observed moving through the city with groups of uniformed NLA”

The NLA used civilians as human shields to prevent the Macedonian Security forces from successfully mounting operations against them.
Events in Macedonia related to Ljuboten

In June 2001, the NLA attempted to conduct terrorist attacks on Macedonia’s capital Skopje. First, the NLA occupied the village of Aračinovo, north-east of Skopje, and threatened to shell its refinery, airport and Parliament. Next, two plain clothed NLA battalions were installed in Skopje in order to start street fights. In late June 2001, the NLA installed two plain clothed battalions (commanded by Xhezair Shaqiri, a.k.a. Commander Hoxha) in suburbs inhabited with ethnic Albanians in Skopje. Plain clothed NLA battalions were also stationed in Kumanovo.

On 11 June 2001, the President and Commander-in-Chief of Macedonia’s armed forces, Mr Boris Trajkovski (deceased), decided to form a Defence Command for Skopje and for the Chief of the General Staff to issue an order to deploy units for the defence of Skopje. The task of the security forces was:

“In joint action, with the neighbors and bodies of the Ministry of Interior Affairs – Internal Affairs – and Civil Defence, to control the access points towards the city of Skopje, to destroy the discovered diversion and terrorist groups, and to hinder the infiltration of diversion and terrorist groups into the city and into the region of vital facilities and actions upon these.”

On the same day, the Macedonian security forces took up defence and control positions throughout Skopje. Police officers from Čair police station also set up checkpoints on the roads between Ljubanci and Ljuboten, and next to the church in Ljuboten in the direction of the village of Raštak.

These measures and activities of the Macedonian security forces greatly impeded the free movement of the NLA and the illegal transport of weapons, equipment and logistical support from Ljuboten to the NLA in Matejče and Nikuštak, in the direction Aračinovo – Ljuboten – Matejče – Nikuštak.

The agreed withdrawal of the NLA from Aračinovo on 26 June 2001 (which was aided and organized by NATO and KFOR forces) had positive and negative effects. The positive effects were:

1. That the lives of many NLA members (and probably members of the Macedonian security forces) in Aračinovo were spared;
2. It prevented possible collateral damage to the property of the residents of Aračinovo;
3. It avoided a situation that could have had severe repercussions on the subsequent cohabitation of ethnic Albanians and other non-ethnic Albanian citizens, especially in Aračinovo. (It must also be noted that the Macedonian security forces even offered medical treatment to the wounded and injured NLA in Aračinovo, thus showing the completely understandable human side of the Macedonian authorities).

However, the withdrawal also had a very significant negative effect on the subsequent development of events on the state of security in Macedonia. Namely, the withdrawal of the armed Albanian extremists and their weapons (organized by NATO and conducted by KFOR) resulted in the continuation of the agony of armed clashes, incidents and terrorist acts by the NLA. It also led to the incident in Ljuboten.

The majority of NLA terrorists extracted from Aračinovo with the aid of NATO and KFOR ended up in Nikuštak. A smaller number of the NLA terrorists (with Xhavit Asani and Nazmi Sulejmani) returned to Ljuboten on foot through the village of Raštak. Their return to Ljuboten aimed to maintain the tension in the area of Skopska Crna Gora by preparing and undertaking activities to continue the armed provocations, incidents and terrorist actions against the members and buildings of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Army of Macedonia. This particular group chose the village of Ljuboten as its principal logistical base for the supply and storage of weapons and the mobilization of volunteers. This group also mined the road leading towards the village of Bašinec.

Some of the plain clothed NLA were caught taking shelter in an ethnic Albanian house in the suburb of Čair (1 km from Skopje’s city center) and neutralized by Macedonian security forces. The purpose of this installation was to proclaim NLA “free territories” in the event that the Ohrid Framework Agreement was not signed.

In July and August 2001, the NLA ethnically cleansed ethnic Macedonian villages in Tetovo, kidnapped and killed civilians and tortured many more. As OSCE reported:

“The Mission specialist confirmed reports from the OSCE Tetovo Area Monitors that even during the ceasefire, the ethnic Macedonians civilian population north of Tetovo is under heavy pressure from the Ethnic Albanian Armed Groups to leave. The pressure takes the form of kidnappings, temporary detentions and serious persistent forms of intimidation and restrictions on the movement of civilians attempting to engage in ordinary activities such as agriculture shopping and going to work. The conduct of the Ethnic Albanian Armed Groups is consistent with an attempt to ethnically cleanse the area”

Ethnic Macedonians were told to either leave or be killed by the NLA in Tetovo as well as Kumanovo, which areas were ethnically cleansed by the NLA of the local ethnic Macedonian, Serbs and others. The victims of this ethnic cleansing have not been able to return their homes to date.

In Aračinovo, all ethnic Macedonian houses were burned and the Macedonians to date live in temporary shelters.

The NLA threatened to shell Skopje. On 7 August 2001, plain clothed NLA (led by Commander Teli) were detected and eliminated in Skopje.

On 8 August 2001, 10 Macedonian soldiers were killed in an ambush on the Skopje-Tetovo Highway in similar fashion to the earlier killing of 10 Macedonian soldiers in Karpalak on the Tetovo- Skopje Highway. The Karpalak massacre was the result of the public leaking of an order by the President to thwart the NLA on the road Tetovo-Jazince. The President’s awareness that his commands were being leaked down the chain of command was pivotal to his decision to keep the Ljuboten operation a secret.

Because of the gravity of situation, the Macedonian Security Council that met on 10 August 2001 demanded firm action.
The action of the security forces on 12 August 2001 in Ljuboten

Approximately 8am on 12 August 2001, the NLA (positioned near the church in several houses with high walls that were used as protection) started firing with small arms and probably toward the direction of the Macedonian houses where the police check point and the police officers were stationed. The NLA later attacked police stationed west of the church in the Macedonian houses with three mortars. It was impossible that Macedonian forces fired the mortars because the Macedonian forces were stationed at this position and the church was used as a marker (benchmark) for targeting. The NLA was firing mortars on Ljubanci as well. During this time the NLA terrorists started attacking the Macedonian army positions stationed at the positions Smok and Bomba. The Army received clear orders to start the attack from Major Despodov. The Army stationed at the position Smok started opening fire from machine gun, sniper and other small arms. Captain Grozdanovski gave coordinates to the mortar battery to open fire.

The NLA was located in north-east Ljuboten in the houses on the Road to Raštak. It consists of four identical houses on the road and one separate house close to the houses uphill. This position is approximately 400 meters from the position Smok. The Army saw a machine gun stationed at the house, on the roof, where the roof tiles were removed. The flame of the firing was visible. The Army responded with machine gun and sniper at the lower houses in the morning and with machine gun, sniper and mortar fire to the above house later in the day. This position was described by OSCE as follows:

“Near the field where the bodies of the three men were found, there are two complexes of houses. On the right side of the road is a group of four white houses. One of the dead men in the field is the owner of the first white house. On the left, and in the immediate area of one body and the field with the other two, is a group of two houses and a bam. The buildings on the left have been burned and have been the subject of considerable incoming weapons fire. These buildings are located where they could be a useful observation point from which to monitor Macedonian movements or direct firing upon them.”

Security forces arrived at a house. The Macedonian police forces were hesitating how to proceed because there is an open field around the church and they were afraid that someone might fire on them. Because of the heavy fire of the NLA, the Police engaged the NLA but did not dare to enter deeply in the village until 11am.

At around 11am, the NLA started coordinated mortar attack on the positions of the Army. At the same time, the NLA reinforcement that was coming from Matejče opened mortar fire from Bel Kamen. Around 12 mortars exploded close to the Army positions. The army responded with 120mm and 88mm mortars. The NLA group that was coming from Bel Kamen consisted of approximately 70-100 members and their aim was to reinforce the NLA already in Ljuboten. The Army found number of weapons and equipment in this area on 14 August 2001. The Army successfully repealed the attempt to reinforce their positions in Ljuboten. At that time, the NLA members in the village, knowing that the reinforcement will not arrive, started to panic and were trying to regroup and escape. Those who were with guns and uniforms tried to dispose of their weapons and uniforms if they were able to do so.

After 11am, the Police in the village neutralized one NLA position. A Hermelin Armed Personal Carrier was sent to assist the police because they were unable to break the resistance at other NLA positions. It was only when the Hermelin came that they were able to crash the resistance of the NLA.

With the Hermelin, the police proceeded to another NLA position. During their approach, the NLA was shooting from the Jashari house. When the NLA saw that they were unable to stop the advance of the police with the Hermelin, the NLA left the house and temporarily hid in a tobacco nylon stack. When the NLA (dressed in black uniforms) tried to escape in the direction of the mountain towards the NLA positions in Bel Kamen, the army spotted them, and opened fire on them with sniper, machine guns and automatic rifles from the positions Smok and Bomba. The army sniper killed the first terrorist that was running. As witness Grozdanovski said:

“I’m sure about one because a sniper that fired first hit the person. That was the only weapon firing at that time and that person fell down. That’s why I’m sure we hit one person and once the other soldiers started firing..”

When the terrorist was hit, his weapon dropped from his hand. It was probably Kadri Jashari, who was wearing a black uniform, black pants and black jacket. As a witness said:

“He must have been hit by a big bullet, because his shoulder and his arm almost were separated from his body”

The army continued shooting at the others that were fleeing and probably killed two more persons. The Defence believes that these were Xhelal Bajrami and Bajram Jashari, who were dressed in black uniforms, black pants and black jackets. When the Police near the Jashari house heard the shooting they took positions and opened fire on the terrorists. Two of the terrorists escaped. The Police recovered three weapons from the terrorists, one Thompson submachine gun and two AK-47 of Chinese origin with ammunition. The weapons were put inside the Hermelin and transported to the Brača house. During the autopsy of Xhelal Bajrami, 26 rounds of live ammunitions were found in the pockets of the clothing of Mr. Bajrami. All the bullets originated either from Albania or China.

After this NLA position was neutralized, the action of the Macedonian security forces stopped and there was no more shooting. The Police and the Hermelin retreated in the direction of Ljubanci. After the operation was finished at the Braca House, the chief of the Police in the field, Mr. Ljube Krstevski, head of OVR Čair briefed the Minister for Internal Affairs, Mr Ljube Boškoski about the operation.

During this action, the Macedonian security forces arrested a group of 10 suspected terrorists that were hiding in a basement of one house near the mosque. Members of the Bajrami Family (who actively participated in and assisted the NLA) were hiding in the house. Rafiz and Shefajet Bajrami were distinguished members of the NLA that took part in the planting the mine on the 10 August that killed 8 soldiers and Sulejman Bajrami was part of the logistics. They were arrested and brought walking on foot towards the Braca house. None of them was seriously injured and they were able to walk on their feet without assistance. One rifle and ammunition were discovered at the house.

NLA members together with large group of civilians set off in the direction of Skopje. On their way they were attacked by large group of civilians from the village of Radišani. The Police forces intervened and arrested approximately 100 villagers. Paraffin tests were conducted to determine whether any had used fire weapons. Those who tested positive were brought to an Investigative judge who ordered pre-trial detention. Those who tested negative were released.
Responsibility of Johan Tračulovski for the offence of murder

It has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Tarčulovski participated in any of the deaths of the alleged victims in Ljuboten. It has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Tarčulovski either committed, planned, ordered, instigated or aided and abetted the crimes of murder as charged. Mr. Tarčulovski was not recognized by any of the crime base witnesses as being present at the location where the alleged murder took place. There is evidence that Mr. Tarčulovski allegedly arrived to the scene of the death of three NLA terrorists outside the Jashari house after these individuals were killed, either by the army or the police on ground. There is no evidence that Mr. Tarčulovski in any way contributed to the killing of any of the alleged victims. Even if he was present, there is no sufficient evidence that Mr. Tarčulovski in any way assisted, encouraged or lent moral support for the killings as the law requires. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Tarčulovski did anything other than to obey the order of the President to be on the ground to monitor the situation. Such participation of Mr. Tarčulovski is not sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. The Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that his contribution in the common plan should be at least a significant one. Not every type of conduct amounts to a significant enough contribution to the common purpose to impute criminal liability to the accused for the crimes alleged to have been committed.

In summary, the Law must be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that any of the victims were:

A civilian; and

He did not in any way take an active part in the hostilities; and

If it is shown to have been killed by a member of the police that:

1. He was killed intentionally; and
2. That the killer was aware at the time that he was an un-armed civilian; and
3. Mr. Tarčulovski himself was aware of the protected status of the victims and that they were killed despite or in disregard of their status. An inference on that point should not easily be drawn as this requirement is both an element of the crime and a condition of the criminal character of the act itself. It was the duty of the Trial Chamber to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that a victim was murdered, or exclude him having taken an active part in the hostilities at the time of his death.

Mr. Tarčulovski acted with awareness that:

1. There was shooting from civilian houses directed at the army and the police;
2. A number of NLA terrorists were seen in Ljuboten;
3. That there were NLA terrorists present in Ljuboten;
4. Police and the army are preparing action against NLA
5. The Action of the Army and the Police was ordered by the President;
6. The NLA was using civilian objects as military installations;
7. There were NLA terrorists mingling with civilians; and
8. The NLA did not make attempt to distinguish itself from the civilians.

It has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Tarčulovski was aware at the time that the three killed persons who he allegedly saw were an un-armed civilians. On the contrary, weapons and ammunitions used by the NLA terrorists were immediately seized by the Macedonian security forces and later shown to Johan.
Responsibility of Johan Tračulovski for the crime of wanton destruction

Mr. Tarčulovski did not share any plan or criminal purpose to destroy civilian property on a large scale in Ljuboten. Mr. Tarčulovski was not seen in the places where civilian property was allegedly destroyed, nor assisted or contributed to the execution of the alleged crime. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Tarčulovski did anything other than to obey the order of the President to be on the ground to monitor the situation. Such participation of Mr. Tarčulovski is not sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. The Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that his contribution in the common plan should be at least a significant one. Not every type of conduct amounts to a significant enough contribution to the common purpose to impute criminal liability to the accused for the crimes committed.

None of this was proven nor evidence submitted. On the contrary, Mr. Tarčulovski was aware that:

1. There was shooting from civilian houses directed at the army and the police;
2. A number of NLA terrorists were seen in village of Ljuboten;
3. Acted with awareness that there are NLA terrorists present in Ljuboten;
4. Police and the army were preparing an action against the NLA pursuant to an order by the President.

The confirmed presence of NLA terrorists in the civilian houses (or of civilians among the terrorists) and their usage of civilian houses and religious objects as military installations (not only in Ljuboten but all over Macedonia) will be relevant to any inference sought to be drawn as to the state of mind of Mr. Tarčulovski at the time.
Responsibility of Johan Tarčulovski for the crime of Cruel Treatment

The Prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Tarčulovski was part of a plan or criminal purpose to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or constitute a serious attack on human dignity. Mr. Tarčulovski was not even close to the locations of alleged cruel treatment. There is only evidence that Mr. Tarčulovski was around the Ametovski house and they consulted each other for the origin of some driver licenses. The Defence does not accept this testimony to be correct, because at it was said all the participants were wearing masks and if the Trial Chambers accepts this testimony, it can be inferred that Mr. Tarčulovski arrived at the scene after the attack was finished to monitor the situation. There is no evidence that he entered the house or that anyone of the five witnesses that testified on trial from this location recognized him. Even if he was present there is no sufficient evidence that Mr. Tarčulovski in any way assisted, encouraged or lent moral support for his killing as the law requires. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Tarčulovski did anything other than to obey the order of the President to be on the ground to monitor the situation. Such participation of Mr. Tarčulovski is not sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. The Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that his contribution in the common plan should be at least a significant one. Not every type of conduct amounts to a significant enough contribution to the common purpose to impute criminal liability to the accused for the crimes committed.

United for Johan” – Established Association for the support of Johan Tarculovski in Melbourne, Australia

Since the promotion of the initiative for the formation of an Association in support of Johan Tarculovski on 1-st of May, 2009, in the presence of a large number of supporters of all generations at the Golden Star Reception in Epping, the official formation of the Association in support of Johan, took place. In a pleasant and positive atmosphere the attendees were informed in detail about the initiative and a letter of appreciation and acceptance from Johan Tarculovski and his wife Sonja Tarculovska was read out in support for the formation of this Association.

The Association will operate within the framework of the current “Association of citizens in support of Johan Tarculovski” in Macedonia with the same statute and objectives under the name ‘United for Johan”. An official letter of agreement has been received from the “Association of citizens in support of Johan Tarculovski”, Macedonia and the president Aleksandar Kolevski, authorizing Donco Angeloski, proprietor of Radio Ilinden in Melbourne, for the formation in Melbourne.

The association will operate as a non-profit organization and as such will prepare a organized campaign for maximum support of Johan.

‘United for Johan’ will play an important role in emphasizing the Macedonian peoples contempt of The Hague Tribunal’s decision and injustice which undermined Macedonia and the whole international legal system. We must expose that the United Nations, via The Hague Tribunal, as one of its judicial bodies, once again breached the procedures and rules of law for which they aspire to protect.

The Association ‘United for Johan’ appeals to all individuals, organizations, associations and clubs in the Macedonian community to support this action and be part of the organized campaign. All those interested can assist with personal donations which will be forwarded directly to Johan, become members of our Association and hence contribute to the success of the campaign.

During these difficult times Johan must know that the Macedonian people sympathize with his plight, support him and and are fighting for his release.

If Johan was prepared to defend Macedonia when she needed it most then it’s time we Macedonians in Australia stand up to defend Johan. At the same time we will send a clear message to the court in The Hague and the world that the Macedonian people are in Solidarity with Johan and are ready and willing to unite against this injustice.

The motto of ‘United for Johan’ is Johan for Macedonia! Macedonia and Macedonians for Johan!

For more information please contact the spokesperson of the Association ‘United for Johan’, Jane Mavcev on the following number: +61 4 0591 6906

Respectfully
Committee of the Association for the support of Johan Tarculovski ‘
United for Johan, Melbourne, Australia.

Dukes Night – Komitska Vecer

The Foreign Committee of VMRO-DPMNE in Melbourne and “United for Johan” Association invites you to join us at the third traditional, Dukes Night “Komitska Vecer” dedicated to Johan Tarculovski.

24 OCTOBER
Golden Star Reception,
15 Yale dr,
Epping 3076,
Melbourne Australia
Starts at 6pm

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Donations

Donations can be made to the following bank account:
240100001791420
Uni Banka, Skopje, Macedonia
to Sonja Tarculovska.

Johan needs your support!